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Posts:
2008:
#51-60
(7/13)
#41-50 (5/27)
#31-40 (2/15)
2007:
#21-30 (10/3)
#11-20 (6/28)
#1-10 (3/31)
On St. Augustine (2/3)
On St. John Climacus (1/26)
2006:
12/25
9/24
9/5
8/23
6/1
An Introduction (5/10)
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#41-50 (5/27/08)
41. [Oral
Tradition]
42.
[Lineage of Teaching]
43.
[Hearsay]
44.
[Collections of Texts]
45.
[Impressive Speakers]
46.
[Respected Teachers]
47.
[Logic]
48.
[Inferential Reasoning]
49.
[Reasoned Cogitation]
50.
[Accepting a View After Pondering It]
In the
Anguttara Nikaya (this part excerpted in the wonderful
anthology,
In the Buddha’s Words, p. 89), the Buddha is approached
by a monk who isn’t sure what to make of other brahmins &
ascetics around who “explain and elucidate their own doctrines,
but disparage, debunk, revile, and vilify the doctrines of
others. For us,” he goes on, “there is perplexity and doubt as
to which of these good ascetics speak truth and which speaks
falsehood.” & the Buddha replies, “It is fitting for you to be
perplexed, O Kalamas, it is fitting for you to be in doubt.
Doubt has arisen in you about a perplexing matter. Come, Kalamas,”
he says, & goes on to say “do not go by—” —& names ten things
“not to go by.” Here are those ten, & some thoughts on them:
41. [Oral
Tradition]
The first
is oral tradition. Unlike today, an “oral tradition” in the
Buddha’s time probably suggested an extremely accurate
transmission of scripture—for instance, it’s possible to prove
that the Rig Veda was transmitted orally for centuries
with tremendous precision & hardly any change at all.
But
neither the suggestion of accuracy or, in our time, the likely
suspicion of corruption in something passed down for years
before it was written down—neither of these matter when
assessing the ultimate truth of a teaching. Whether it could be
proved a phrase or entire book was actually passed down with no
changes at all, or that something went through tremendous change
over the course of time—both of these only prove their accuracy
or inaccuracy in terms of the person (or God) they are supposed
to have come down from; whereas the nice thing about Buddhism is
that truth alone matters, not who spoke it or when it was
spoken. As Dwight Goddard says, “Should the events in the life
of Gautama Sakyamuni turn out to be unhistorical, that would not
in the least detract from the merit of his teachings. As the
Blessed One himself has said, the teaching carries with it its
own demonstration.”
—This
demonstration & authority having nothing to do with any
historical event whatsoever; it’s only for the sake of
convenience that the Buddha is even mentioned as having said
them at all—it’s the words that matter, not who said them, or
when. We cannot become attached or swayed or convinced by
something only because it supposedly came down from
somebody’s actual words or deeds.
42.
[Lineage of Teaching]
The second
thing “not to go by” is a lineage of teaching, & the reasons I
think are the same: it’s easy to get distracted from the truth
or experience of what you’re doing, & instead get stuck on some
tradition of teaching, some school, some denomination rather
than another, of being persuaded by something simply because
“it’s been around for so long”—since this could easily lead to
an almost blind adherence not to finding truth, but to finding
truth only through the lens of a specific school or way of
teaching. The antiquity or reputation of a lineage of teaching
might be impressive, but as with oral tradition, the only thing
that should be impressive or have a reputation at all are the
words themselves, not anything attached to them. (& in the same
way, something shouldn’t be avoided because it lacks a
lineage or reputation.)
43.
[Hearsay]
The third
is hearsay. If in the Buddha’s time “oral tradition” suggested
accuracy of transmission, hearsay suggests its opposite, or
maybe even something like the rumor of a “new” teaching that
somehow undermines a received tradition. This ends up being the
spiritual equivalent of wearing something strange just because
it’s odd & will make people uncomfortable, or make you look
rebellious; or like the folks whose kneejerk reaction is to run
to something like The Gospel of Thomas simply because it
was rejected by the Catholic church, not because of the actual &
wonderful truth found there. The truth of a thing has no
relation to whether it’s been received & transmitted accurately,
distorted to the point of being unrecognizable, or whether it
seems conservative & holding to tradition or if it seems
subversive. Truth is truth.
44.
[Collections of Texts]
The fourth
is to be wary of the written & printed versions of the first
two—actual collections of texts. It’s easy to become distracted
& taken up with the finality that a Collection of Texts
suggests. Here, someone might say (when beholding the
entirety of the New Testament, the Pali Canon, the Rig Veda,
or whatever it is), here is truth, so that something
largely intangible—the religious experience—is suddenly bounded
by walls, & surrounded by a sense of certainty that I don’t
think faith can ever attain (since then it would no longer be
faith).
It’s more
than helpful to organize something like the Epistles of Saint
Paul together (or as above to organize for the sake of
convenience the Buddha’s teachings)—but to go further than this,
to say with absolute clarity that these texts & this arrangement
only are the final word on the spiritual life of
humanity, to the exclusion of all others—this is the
temptation of being taken up by a collection of texts.
For
instance, the Rule of St. Benedict is extremely similar
to an anonymous text called The Rule of the Master, &
until the late 1930’s it was assumed Benedict’s came first, but
since then it’s been proven that Benedict’s Rule was the
derivative work, even though it’s obvious he greatly improved
much of what he adapted. The Buddha would no doubt say that
while the proper dating of these texts is relevant to historians
of religion, or historians interested in the development of
European monasticism, to someone only seeking a good & true way
to live their life, the argument is only a distraction. St.
Benedict could be the author of his Rule, he could have
copied much of it from The Rule of the Master, or an
alien could have come down & written it; the question of
authorship is irrelevant next to the truth & help it offers—& in
the case of Benedict’s Rule, that truth & help is
obviously massive.
To be
fair, it’s doubtful the Rule would’ve had the impact it
did if the monks organized under it hadn’t thought Benedict
himself had written it (which shows the limitations of becoming
attached to a person, even a great saint!). Or maybe not—perhaps
whoever wrote The Rule of the Master would now be known
as one of the chief sources from which European monasticism
came. Either way, the challenge is to have one of the most
tremendous experiences a human being can have (of sudden
religious insight or revelation) & realize the possibility of
someone else having an experience of the same depth that may
disagree with your own, & to allow both to be valid.
This seems
to be the real core of faith & humility—on the one hand, having
the experience but admitting other experiences like it are
possible, and on the other, the utter confidence & faith that
the contradictory experiences of others cannot cancel out your
own—& so neither can other scriptures, other teachers, or other
faiths.
45.
[Impressive Speakers]
The fifth
is to be wary of impressive speakers. This is even further
removed from the above, since the question isn’t even the
validity of the words themselves, only that they’re being
presented well. One thinks of politicians, who, with
speech-writers, their own charisma, & lots of practice, can
appear extremely eloquent & impressive—though very rarely is
there any substance to what they’re actually saying. The
opposite of this point is true as well, that to imagine a poor
guy with no ability to speak publicly & with no charisma
whatsoever—even if he were to eventually come around all
fumbling & say something like Treat others as you would want
to be treated—the truth of what he’s saying has nothing to
do with the clumsy way he finally came to say it. How a
thing is said is no judgment on its veracity. The veracity of a
statement is in the words alone.
It was nice to find St. Augustine saying
exactly the same thing in his
Confessions:
The content did not seem better to me for being better
presented, nor true because skillfully expressed, nor the man
wise of soul because he had a handsome face and a graceful turn
of speech. […] so I had already learned under your tuition that
nothing should be regarded as true because it is eloquently
stated, nor false because the words sound clumsy. On the other
hand, it is not true for being expressed in uncouth language
either, nor false because couched in splendid words. I had come
to understand that just as wholesome and rubbishy food may both
be served equally well in sophisticated dishes or in others of
rustic quality, so too can wisdom and foolishness be proffered
in language elegant or plain.
Nowadays
this seems a terribly important thing to keep in mind, since
there are at least a dozen things that can distract us from what
someone is actually saying—the design of a bookcover or website,
whether what’s said appears in a book or a magazine or a
newspaper (& in what newspaper or magazine), what the person’s
reputation is, how old they are, etc. etc.—all of which might
well give us an idea of what might be coming, but is no
substitute for substance itself.
46.
[Respected Teachers]
The sixth
is to be wary of respected teachers (& as with the others, it’s
nice to know the Buddha would no doubt be including himself in
all of these), & the reasons are essentially the same as those
above for lineage of teaching—here’s a teacher who’s gathered a
bunch of people around him, & has a great knowledge of
scripture. While this alone might be impressive, it doesn’t
actually mean anything when it comes down to what he actually
teaches. How many people have we seen who can quote vast
amounts of the scripture who just want to use the great
abilities of their memory or studies to tell most of humanity
they’re wrong, & they can only save themselves by converting to
whatever the speaker attaches himself to? Simply having a
following, & simply being able to do the things that can attract
a following—even years of study & the most sincere
introspection—should have no ability to convince us. Truth is
faceless, & beyond all these things.
47.
[Logic]
The
seventh, logic, is defined in the dictionary as “The
study of the principles of reasoning, especially of the
structure of propositions as distinguished from their content
and of method and validity in deductive reasoning.” Athanasius
of Alexandria, in his
Life of St. Antony, has
Antony
answer this well enough:
Therefore, for those in whom the
action through faith is present, the demonstration through
arguments is unnecessary, or perhaps even useless. For what we
perceive by faith you attempt to establish through arguments.
And often you are unable even to articulate what we see; so it
is clear that the action through faith is better and more secure
than your sophistic conclusions.
Living in
a world, as we do, overwhelmed by the experiences of the senses,
it’s important for things to be “verified,” or “proven,” for
there to be yes or no about so many things—think
of advertising, or how corporations are run, or how an athlete’s
daily & monthly & yearly & lifetime statistics are bantered
about & dissected, all this for a million different conclusions
& suppositions, & even (with advertising) some concrete & proven
things on the way people spend money & live. None of this is
necessary with religion. It’s an experience that demands no
explanation, no proof, no “verification.”
Carbon
dating & historical events & architectural plans for properly
constructing a building benefit from this, but faith can’t be
faith if it’s turned into a math problem or a spreadsheet or a
list of dates (& thank God). In the throes of a truly astounding
religious experience, or a vision, or moment of insight, I don’t
imagine that alongside the experience our brain is saying,
Wow, this sure renders [insert religion here] completely wrong!
It’s only after the experience, back in the world where it
occurs to us to even make such distinctions & judgments, that
“reasonable” things even matter.
48.
[Inferential Reasoning]
The eighth
is to infer, or “To hint; imply,” as the dictionary would have
it. This seems just a subtler & less concretely verifiable
version of “logic.” But as with logic, it still involves trying
to piece together, or make sense, which inevitably takes away
from the experience itself, as if God were a puzzle that could
be put together. It seems impossible to get away from doing
this, it seems impossible to stop thinking (& trying to write
about it is even more ridiculous, & even more removed &
desperate, believing that writing about an experience that
shouldn’t be thought about too much can bring some kind of
clarity)—so instead I’ll just quote St. Anselm talking about
something like this:
I do not try, Lord, to penetrate your heights, for in no way
could my intellect be worthy; but I desire to know something of
your truth, which my heart believes and loves. For I do not seek
to understand, in order to believe; rather, I believe, so that I
will understand. I do believe that unless I believed first, I
would not understand.
49.
[Reasoned Cogitation]
The ninth,
reasoned cogitation, is defined as “Thoughtful consideration;
meditation.” (Though not the Buddha’s kind of meditation) It’s
amazing to me that the Buddha goes this far in granting the
primacy of a largely indefinable way of perceiving and
experiencing things as the most pure apprehension of what is
holy. Even thinking about it, even being thoughtful
& trying to figure it out—even this is too much, & shouldn’t be
taken for any kind of authority whatsoever. I remember
Dostoevsky’s great remark (which I don’t think I’ve really
understood until just now, as I’m typing it), “If anyone ever
proved to me, beyond any doubt, while I am on my dying bed, that
Christ is not the truth, that the real truth is another one, if
the arguments provided to me were impossible to contradict, I
wouldn’t give it another thought: I would choose Christ over
truth.” (It’s nice too that the website I found this at wasn’t
sure if it was Dostoevsky who actually said this; & it’s nice I
remember reading this quote in a book a long time ago, but can’t
recall which one it was—it’s nice that Dostoevsky may have never
said this at all, since the truth & insight of it isn’t in who
supposedly said it, but in the words themselves.)
50.
[Accepting a View After Pondering It]
& the last
one is “Accepting a View After Pondering It.” This seems
relatively the same as the last three, & I realized halfway
through writing even this that simply by writing about
it, & trying to wonder what the Buddha was saying & meant—even
in this I attempted to use a kind of logic & reasoning—even this
list of “10 Things the Buddha Said to Beware Of”—even calling it
this, & mentioning the scripture it came from, suggests an
authority & finality & an adherence to a text, in a way going
against the first few in the list. Even to simply & gleefully
say, “Religious faith has nothing to do with logic or reasoning”
is to have nailed down another creed & another dogma, & is
somehow to speak logically & reasonably. When talking with words
about things that’re beyond words, it’s simply impossible not
to do this.
I could
say, for instance, that religious fundamentalists who want to
convert everybody to their way of thinking is the equivalent of
me telling the world that I love my wife so much that everyone
should marry her, & no one else; or that our marriage is so
wonderful that everyone else’s is obviously garbage.
Then, I
could say that this is ridiculous, & I could continue & say that
I believe (as I do) that religious faith should be very much
like marriage—it’s personal, & it means literally the world &
literally everything for the two people involved in it, but that
meaning & the exclusivity of an individual marriage doesn’t
render impossible the same deep experience among other couples.
I could
say that religious life ought to be like this—that we should be
able to accept the reality of other religious experiences &
doctrines the same as we effortlessly assume that the love we
feel for our spouses can easily exist between two completely
different people, & even for completely different reasons.
& then I
could say, just think how happy people usually are when you tell
them you’re getting married. & I could then wonder why that kind
of joy isn’t given to the experience of God, whatever it is. I
could say, Why are you judging another person’s experience?
But to say
all these things is, alas, to judge too. Why should everyone
think like me? They shouldn’t.
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