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Previous Posts:

2008:
#41-50 (5/27)
#31-40 (2/15)

2007:
#21-30 (10/3)
#11-20 (6/28)
#1-10 (3/31)
On St. Augustine (2/3)
On St. John Climacus (1/26)

2006:
12/25
9/24
9/5
8/23
6/1
An Introduction (5/10)

 

#41-50 (5/27/08)

41. [Oral Tradition]

42. [Lineage of Teaching]

43. [Hearsay]

44. [Collections of Texts]

45. [Impressive Speakers]

46. [Respected Teachers]

47. [Logic]

48. [Inferential Reasoning]

49. [Reasoned Cogitation]

50. [Accepting a View After Pondering It]

 

In the Anguttara Nikaya (this part excerpted in the wonderful anthology, In the Buddha’s Words, p. 89), the Buddha is approached by a monk who isn’t sure what to make of other brahmins & ascetics around who “explain and elucidate their own doctrines, but disparage, debunk, revile, and vilify the doctrines of others. For us,” he goes on, “there is perplexity and doubt as to which of these good ascetics speak truth and which speaks falsehood.” & the Buddha replies, “It is fitting for you to be perplexed, O Kalamas, it is fitting for you to be in doubt. Doubt has arisen in you about a perplexing matter. Come, Kalamas,” he says, & goes on to say “do not go by—” —& names ten things “not to go by.” Here are those ten, & some thoughts on them:

 

41. [Oral Tradition]

The first is oral tradition. Unlike today, an “oral tradition” in the Buddha’s time probably suggested an extremely accurate transmission of scripture—for instance, it’s possible to prove that the Rig Veda was transmitted orally for centuries with tremendous precision & hardly any change at all.

But neither the suggestion of accuracy or, in our time, the likely suspicion of corruption in something passed down for years before it was written down—neither of these matter when assessing the ultimate truth of a teaching. Whether it could be proved a phrase or entire book was actually passed down with no changes at all, or that something went through tremendous change over the course of time—both of these only prove their accuracy or inaccuracy in terms of the person (or God) they are supposed to have come down from; whereas the nice thing about Buddhism is that truth alone matters, not who spoke it or when it was spoken. As Dwight Goddard says, “Should the events in the life of Gautama Sakyamuni turn out to be unhistorical, that would not in the least detract from the merit of his teachings. As the Blessed One himself has said, the teaching carries with it its own demonstration.”

—This demonstration & authority having nothing to do with any historical event whatsoever; it’s only for the sake of convenience that the Buddha is even mentioned as having said them at all—it’s the words that matter, not who said them, or when. We cannot become attached or swayed or convinced by something only because it supposedly came down from somebody’s actual words or deeds.

 

 

42. [Lineage of Teaching]

The second thing “not to go by” is a lineage of teaching, & the reasons I think are the same: it’s easy to get distracted from the truth or experience of what you’re doing, & instead get stuck on some tradition of teaching, some school, some denomination rather than another, of being persuaded by something simply because “it’s been around for so long”—since this could easily lead to an almost blind adherence not to finding truth, but to finding truth only through the lens of a specific school or way of teaching. The antiquity or reputation of a lineage of teaching might be impressive, but as with oral tradition, the only thing that should be impressive or have a reputation at all are the words themselves, not anything attached to them. (& in the same way, something shouldn’t be avoided because it lacks a lineage or reputation.)

 

 

43. [Hearsay]

The third is hearsay. If in the Buddha’s time “oral tradition” suggested accuracy of transmission, hearsay suggests its opposite, or maybe even something like the rumor of a “new” teaching that somehow undermines a received tradition. This ends up being the spiritual equivalent of wearing something strange just because it’s odd & will make people uncomfortable, or make you look rebellious; or like the folks whose kneejerk reaction is to run to something like The Gospel of Thomas simply because it was rejected by the Catholic church, not because of the actual & wonderful truth found there. The truth of a thing has no relation to whether it’s been received & transmitted accurately, distorted to the point of being unrecognizable, or whether it seems conservative & holding to tradition or if it seems subversive. Truth is truth.

 

 

44. [Collections of Texts]

The fourth is to be wary of the written & printed versions of the first two—actual collections of texts. It’s easy to become distracted & taken up with the finality that a Collection of Texts suggests. Here, someone might say (when beholding the entirety of the New Testament, the Pali Canon, the Rig Veda, or whatever it is), here is truth, so that something largely intangible—the religious experience—is suddenly bounded by walls, & surrounded by a sense of certainty that I don’t think faith can ever attain (since then it would no longer be faith).

It’s more than helpful to organize something like the Epistles of Saint Paul together (or as above to organize for the sake of convenience the Buddha’s teachings)—but to go further than this, to say with absolute clarity that these texts & this arrangement only are the final word on the spiritual life of humanity, to the exclusion of all others—this is the temptation of being taken up by a collection of texts.

For instance, the Rule of St. Benedict is extremely similar to an anonymous text called The Rule of the Master, & until the late 1930’s it was assumed Benedict’s came first, but since then it’s been proven that Benedict’s Rule was the derivative work, even though it’s obvious he greatly improved much of what he adapted. The Buddha would no doubt say that while the proper dating of these texts is relevant to historians of religion, or historians interested in the development of European monasticism, to someone only seeking a good & true way to live their life, the argument is only a distraction. St. Benedict could be the author of his Rule, he could have copied much of it from The Rule of the Master, or an alien could have come down & written it; the question of authorship is irrelevant next to the truth & help it offers—& in the case of Benedict’s Rule, that truth & help is obviously massive.

To be fair, it’s doubtful the Rule would’ve had the impact it did if the monks organized under it hadn’t thought Benedict himself had written it (which shows the limitations of becoming attached to a person, even a great saint!). Or maybe not—perhaps whoever wrote The Rule of the Master would now be known as one of the chief sources from which European monasticism came. Either way, the challenge is to have one of the most tremendous experiences a human being can have (of sudden religious insight or revelation) & realize the possibility of someone else having an experience of the same depth that may disagree with your own, & to allow both to be valid.

This seems to be the real core of faith & humility—on the one hand, having the experience but admitting other experiences like it are possible, and on the other, the utter confidence & faith that the contradictory experiences of others cannot cancel out your own—& so neither can other scriptures, other teachers, or other faiths.

 

 

45. [Impressive Speakers]

The fifth is to be wary of impressive speakers. This is even further removed from the above, since the question isn’t even the validity of the words themselves, only that they’re being presented well. One thinks of politicians, who, with speech-writers, their own charisma, & lots of practice, can appear extremely eloquent & impressive—though very rarely is there any substance to what they’re actually saying. The opposite of this point is true as well, that to imagine a poor guy with no ability to speak publicly & with no charisma whatsoever—even if he were to eventually come around all fumbling & say something like Treat others as you would want to be treated—the truth of what he’s saying has nothing to do with the clumsy way he finally came to say it. How a thing is said is no judgment on its veracity. The veracity of a statement is in the words alone.

It was nice to find St. Augustine saying exactly the same thing in his Confessions:

 

The content did not seem better to me for being better presented, nor true because skillfully expressed, nor the man wise of soul because he had a handsome face and a graceful turn of speech. […] so I had already learned under your tuition that nothing should be regarded as true because it is eloquently stated, nor false because the words sound clumsy. On the other hand, it is not true for being expressed in uncouth language either, nor false because couched in splendid words. I had come to understand that just as wholesome and rubbishy food may both be served equally well in sophisticated dishes or in others of rustic quality, so too can wisdom and foolishness be proffered in language elegant or plain.

 

Nowadays this seems a terribly important thing to keep in mind, since there are at least a dozen things that can distract us from what someone is actually saying—the design of a bookcover or website, whether what’s said appears in a book or a magazine or a newspaper (& in what newspaper or magazine), what the person’s reputation is, how old they are, etc. etc.—all of which might well give us an idea of what might be coming, but is no substitute for substance itself.

 

 

46. [Respected Teachers]

The sixth is to be wary of respected teachers (& as with the others, it’s nice to know the Buddha would no doubt be including himself in all of these), & the reasons are essentially the same as those above for lineage of teaching—here’s a teacher who’s gathered a bunch of people around him, & has a great knowledge of scripture. While this alone might be impressive, it doesn’t actually mean anything when it comes down to what he actually teaches. How many people have we seen who can quote vast amounts of the scripture who just want to use the great abilities of their memory or studies to tell most of humanity they’re wrong, & they can only save themselves by converting to whatever the speaker attaches himself to? Simply having a following, & simply being able to do the things that can attract a following—even years of study & the most sincere introspection—should have no ability to convince us. Truth is faceless, & beyond all these things.

 

 

47. [Logic]

The seventh, logic, is defined in the dictionary as “The study of the principles of reasoning, especially of the structure of propositions as distinguished from their content and of method and validity in deductive reasoning.” Athanasius of Alexandria, in his Life of St. Antony, has Antony answer this well enough:

 

Therefore, for those in whom the action through faith is present, the demonstration through arguments is unnecessary, or perhaps even useless. For what we perceive by faith you attempt to establish through arguments. And often you are unable even to articulate what we see; so it is clear that the action through faith is better and more secure than your sophistic conclusions.

 

Living in a world, as we do, overwhelmed by the experiences of the senses, it’s important for things to be “verified,” or “proven,” for there to be yes or no about so many things—think of advertising, or how corporations are run, or how an athlete’s daily & monthly & yearly & lifetime statistics are bantered about & dissected, all this for a million different conclusions & suppositions, & even (with advertising) some concrete & proven things on the way people spend money & live. None of this is necessary with religion. It’s an experience that demands no explanation, no proof, no “verification.”

Carbon dating & historical events & architectural plans for properly constructing a building benefit from this, but faith can’t be faith if it’s turned into a math problem or a spreadsheet or a list of dates (& thank God). In the throes of a truly astounding religious experience, or a vision, or moment of insight, I don’t imagine that alongside the experience our brain is saying, Wow, this sure renders [insert religion here] completely wrong! It’s only after the experience, back in the world where it occurs to us to even make such distinctions & judgments, that “reasonable” things even matter.

 

 

48. [Inferential Reasoning]

The eighth is to infer, or “To hint; imply,” as the dictionary would have it. This seems just a subtler & less concretely verifiable version of “logic.” But as with logic, it still involves trying to piece together, or make sense, which inevitably takes away from the experience itself, as if God were a puzzle that could be put together. It seems impossible to get away from doing this, it seems impossible to stop thinking (& trying to write about it is even more ridiculous, & even more removed & desperate, believing that writing about an experience that shouldn’t be thought about too much can bring some kind of clarity)—so instead I’ll just quote St. Anselm talking about something like this:

 

I do not try, Lord, to penetrate your heights, for in no way could my intellect be worthy; but I desire to know something of your truth, which my heart believes and loves. For I do not seek to understand, in order to believe; rather, I believe, so that I will understand. I do believe that unless I believed first, I would not understand.

 

 

49. [Reasoned Cogitation]

The ninth, reasoned cogitation, is defined as “Thoughtful consideration; meditation.” (Though not the Buddha’s kind of meditation) It’s amazing to me that the Buddha goes this far in granting the primacy of a largely indefinable way of perceiving and experiencing things as the most pure apprehension of what is holy. Even thinking about it, even being thoughtful & trying to figure it out—even this is too much, & shouldn’t be taken for any kind of authority whatsoever. I remember Dostoevsky’s great remark (which I don’t think I’ve really understood until just now, as I’m typing it), “If anyone ever proved to me, beyond any doubt, while I am on my dying bed, that Christ is not the truth, that the real truth is another one, if the arguments provided to me were impossible to contradict, I wouldn’t give it another thought: I would choose Christ over truth.” (It’s nice too that the website I found this at wasn’t sure if it was Dostoevsky who actually said this; & it’s nice I remember reading this quote in a book a long time ago, but can’t recall which one it was—it’s nice that Dostoevsky may have never said this at all, since the truth & insight of it isn’t in who supposedly said it, but in the words themselves.)

 

 

50. [Accepting a View After Pondering It]

& the last one is “Accepting a View After Pondering It.” This seems relatively the same as the last three, & I realized halfway through writing even this that simply by writing about it, & trying to wonder what the Buddha was saying & meant—even in this I attempted to use a kind of logic & reasoning—even this list of “10 Things the Buddha Said to Beware Of”—even calling it this, & mentioning the scripture it came from, suggests an authority & finality & an adherence to a text, in a way going against the first few in the list. Even to simply & gleefully say, “Religious faith has nothing to do with logic or reasoning” is to have nailed down another creed & another dogma, & is somehow to speak logically & reasonably. When talking with words about things that’re beyond words, it’s simply impossible not to do this.

I could say, for instance, that religious fundamentalists who want to convert everybody to their way of thinking is the equivalent of me telling the world that I love my wife so much that everyone should marry her, & no one else; or that our marriage is so wonderful that everyone else’s is obviously garbage.

Then, I could say that this is ridiculous, & I could continue & say that I believe (as I do) that religious faith should be very much like marriage—it’s personal, & it means literally the world & literally everything for the two people involved in it, but that meaning & the exclusivity of an individual marriage doesn’t render impossible the same deep experience among other couples.

I could say that religious life ought to be like this—that we should be able to accept the reality of other religious experiences & doctrines the same as we effortlessly assume that the love we feel for our spouses can easily exist between two completely different people, & even for completely different reasons.

& then I could say, just think how happy people usually are when you tell them you’re getting married. & I could then wonder why that kind of joy isn’t given to the experience of God, whatever it is. I could say, Why are you judging another person’s experience?

But to say all these things is, alas, to judge too. Why should everyone think like me? They shouldn’t.


 

 

 

 

 

© 2005-2008 Tim Miller